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real-world economics review, issue no. 53

Happy talk and the stock market:
Why our situation is worse than many people think
David A. Westbrook ∗
Copyright: David A. Westbrook, 2010

Americans seem to view the stock market as the most important indicator of the
nation’s economic health. Equity trading activity is incessantly reported in almost real time;
the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) shows up on the margins of newspapers and web
pages that have little to do with business. In the present crisis, the “recovery” of the stock
market is taken to indicate that the nation is on its way back to economic health, and by
extension, that the structure of our economy is fundamentally sound, and regulatory reform
presumably need only tinker around the edges.
Recent experience, however, does not encourage us to view stock price increases as
good evidence of economic strength: the stock market was doing very well as we spiraled into
the great recession. More generally, and for many reasons, stock indices are a poor
reflection of our economic well-being: they tend toward “happy talk” that masks a more
complicated and often disconcerting reality. And yet, the political will for financial market
reform appears to fluctuate daily with the movement of the Dow and S&P 500.
In hope of cutting through some of the happy talk to a more honest policy discourse,
it’s worth exploring some of the ways that these indices are biased toward an unduly sunny
view of our situation.
Time Slicing
By restarting the clock in January of 2009, after the near-panic selling of Fall 2008,
we’ve established a misleading baseline for the DJIA and other indicators. The DJIA is still
down almost a third from its peak in 2007, and roughly flat over the last decade (showing a
loss if inflation is taken into account). The dramatic effects of time slicing may be easier to
see in the context of a single company’s stock. Imagine a company whose share price falls
from a price of $100 to $1 in the final months of a given year. Now just imagine that the share
price subsequently recovers to $10 (maybe the company successfully argues that it is too big
to fail, and the government intervenes) in January of the following year. The lucky investor
who (somehow foreseeing government intervention) invests at $1 will reap a return of 1000%.
The stock is still down 90%. But we tend to focus on the 1000% return – the happy talk – not
the 90% loss.
“Up” looks bigger than “Down”
Imagine a stock that falls from $100 a share to $50 a share, i.e., the stock has lost
50% of its value. Now imagine that the price rises to $75 a share. The stock has gained 50%
of its value “back.” Happy talk, even though the stock is actually still way down. Now imagine
that the stock returns to 100, i.e., a 100% gain. More happy talk, but that’s why 2009 was
such a great year for the stock market, and why the administration and Fed clearly did such a
“good job” in helping us to navigate the ”tsunami.”
Both time slicing and the rhetorical distortion of percentages can be illustrated
with a significant, if unusually dramatic, example, AIG. On June 18th, 2007, AIG closed at
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$1450/share. On March 9th, 2009, the share closed at $7, a loss of three orders of
magnitude, but still less than 100%. With good timing, however, the investor who bought on
March 9th would see the share price close on January 21, 2010, at $27.5, a roughly 400%
profit in ten months, no doubt because AIG is a well run business.
Composition
The composition of an index changes over time. Companies that weaken sufficiently
are no longer counted, but are replaced with other companies. The DJIA would look much
different if it still included AIG, Citigroup, and General Motors. Thus, to compare the DJIA of,
say, January 19, 2006 (12,566) with the DJIA of January 21, 2010 (10,389) is to compare two
rather different sets of companies.
This is somewhat like fantasy football, if one could keep picking players as the
season progresses: the DJIA reflects all of the stock price increases, but does not reflect the
large decreases, of the companies that compose(d) it. Therefore the DJIA, like other indexes,
has an upward skew, which conversely means that indicated losses can be significantly
understated.
As the composition of the index changes, our ability to use the index to say
how the market in question (and by extension, our society) is doing over time degrades,
because it’s not the same market. At best, an index indicates fluctuations of aggregate cost
of capital to the kind of companies that happen to be on the index, i.e., an index is sort of a
barometer of financial fashion. For example, during the internet mania, shares on the techheavy NASDAQ soared.
A market without friction
In order to match an index, an actual investor would have to buy and sell the right
companies, at the right time, and incur transaction costs in doing so. None of this shows up
in the index. More generally, indices do not attempt to represent the real world of investing;
the index presents a “frictionless,” and hence flattering, version of the market on which it is
“reporting.”
Demand noise
It is often assumed that demand for a stock indicates belief that the company is
performing well. But when demand is high enough, and when alternative investments are not
attractive (especially during crises, when asset classes fall in tandem), then “demand” may
only indicate that the stock is “good enough for these hard times.” Portfolio managers
typically are under pressure to do something reasonably safe and profitable with the money
under their care, and to do it now. This can be difficult. Leading into the present crisis, the
world was awash in liquidity, and there literally were not enough investments to go ‘round. At
the worst of the crisis, investors bought U.S. government debt at negative yields. Such
“investment” did not indicate belief that the US government was doing well; it indicated belief
that there was no better place to park money. By the same token, and despite the crisis,
today vast quantities of money need to be invested. The United States remains an intensely
capitalized country: schools, hospitals, governments and retirement funds, and so forth – the
structure of our society is mirrored in pools of capital, and that money has to go somewhere.
Much of it goes into the stock market, especially now that interest rates are so low. Such
demand for stock does not necessarily indicate that the companies in question are doing very
well; it may well indicate reinvestment risk. (This can be observed with my own retirement
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funds, such as they are.) Indeed, rather flat earnings, and more generally, sluggish growth
(especially once inventory manipulations are factored out), and miserable employment
numbers, suggest a very different interpretation of how businesses are doing. But we tell
ourselves that the real economy lags the financial economy; hope is required.
Government bias
Much of the “recovery” of the stock market is due to the recovery of share prices in
the financial sector. (At one point last summer, almost 40% of volume in the entire NYSE was
due to trading in just four financial companies.) And why shouldn’t these institutions make
money? The government has ensured the operations of institutions deemed too big to fail.
Much competition has been eliminated, as the companies picked to survive gobbled up those
fated to die. The cost of capital has been lowered in various ways, including guaranteeing
credit, purchasing assets outright, and allowing the use of trashy assets as collateral for low
interest loans. With cheap money in hand, it is fairly easy to make money in financial
markets. Institutional clients, who are in charge of vast amounts of money that must be
managed, have certainly appreciated doing business in these difficult times with a company
backed by something approaching the full faith and credit of the United States. Business has
boomed; profits have risen.
Owning a financial institution that operates without much competition, a guaranteed
spread, a gratefully captive customer base, and assurance of unlimited government funds if
the going gets rough is a sweet proposition. Share prices have risen accordingly. While no
doubt gratifying to those who own such companies, the rising prices of their stock hardly
demonstrate that our financial policy has been a success. More generally, stock prices
should and do reflect the fact that trillions of tax dollars have been spent upon some firms,
including non-financial firms. However, such price increases do not necessarily indicate that
our economy is healthy. In fact, the opposite seems more likely. Rather than the health of the
economy, the index may well be reflecting the fact that it is a good thing to be paid, or
guaranteed, by the government.
So equity indices are skewed upward. Nonetheless, and allowing for a degree of
puffery, rising stock prices are a good thing, right? Not necessarily. It is true that rising stock
prices can indicate a certain optimism, even momentum. As suggested by the example of
massive government intervention with tax dollars, however, stock prices also may rise for
reasons that are not good for anybody but shareholders. We should remember at least some
of the basics of classical economics: in a competitive market, prices (and profits) tend to be
driven down. This is good for consumers; this is the purpose of antitrust laws. In a
competitive market, because profit margins are thin, stock prices should also be relatively low.
Following this logic, widespread increases in stock price may suggest a correction of irrational
downward trading, but may also indicate market power or government subsidy. The bottom
line is that the investors’ (including management’s) interest in rising prices for their stock is
completely understandable, but is not synonymous with a sound market, much less with the
public interest in any broader sense.
The analytic distinction between the price of equity and the public good is crucial for
thinking about government intervention during financial crises. If an investor’s interest in the
price of his stock is not the same thing as society’s interest in a sound market, then we might
draw a parallel distinction between the fortunes of the firms that currently dominate a
business, and the business itself. For obvious example, we might differentiate between
certain large banks, a small collection of very big companies, and banking, which is a
valuable industry with many participants. Investors may be expected to care about the fate of
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the particular banks in which they happen to be invested, but citizens, whether or not they are
investors, should care about banking, and only incidentally about the fate of particular banks.
By the same token, the government, presumably acting on behalf of all citizens, should care
about banking, not about this or that bank. Although this distinction between banking and
banks may seem clear enough in theory, in practice two administrations have conflated the
need to intervene in the financial markets with the need to save particular, well-connected,
institutions, and extended trillions of dollars in aid directly to such institutions.
The results of these highly targeted (and profitable) interventions have been
disappointing. Credit remains tight, and the broader economy weak. The Federal deficit has
soared to record heights, but over two years after the Fed started giving investment banks
access to the discount window, efforts at reform have been modest. The financial industries
have grown more concentrated, and remain vulnerable. Unemployment remains high, job
creation low, foreclosures high . . . The government, in short, has used trillions of dollars to
rescue some financial (and a few non-financial) institutions, but has not rescued banking, or
financial markets more generally, much less the economy. We comfort ourselves by saying
that no other form of intervention was possible, and the alternative was “another Depression.”
But the fact remains that we have very little – beyond stock price increases – to show for the
expenditure of trillions. (Surely there were better ways to avoid another Depression.)
With little really good news, the stock market numbers have assumed even greater
political significance. Improvements in the equity markets have been haled as “green shoots,”
signs of our economy’s revival, that is, the government is on the right course, and as evidence
that the system isn’t that broken, and so little government action is required. While one must
hope that a rising market expresses some renewed confidence in the real economy, a
prudent skepticism is in order. As discussed above, the biases built into indices are
overwhelmingly positive. This is not accidental. Our indices are essentially a way of defining
and reporting on financial markets: Dow Jones, of Dow Jones Industrial Average fame, is a
newspaper company. Treating the Wall Street Journal (another of Dow Jones’ products) as
revealed truth would hardly be prudent –financial journalism generally encourages increased
participation in financial markets, much as the New York Review of Books is enthusiastic
about reading. Unsurprisingly, financial journalism accentuates the positive for the financial
industries and their investors – indices are merely a technical way of doing so. None of this
should be confused with an impartial assessment of the economy’s health.
While enthusiasm for asset prices is hardly new, the use of indexed data for “happy
talk” has been particularly inane recently. The liberal media is, by and large, supportive of the
administration, and so tries to emphasize the relatively strong performance of the stock
market, while downplaying lackluster grown, bad unemployment, and downright shocking
poverty numbers. The conservative media cheers for a stock market recovery and hopes to
avoid increased regulation. Unfortunately, our financial markets, and our broader economy,
have structural problems that those at either end of the political spectrum are unwilling to
confront, presumably for fear of giving ground to their adversaries.
Under such
circumstances, interminable discussion of the stock market stands in for serious engagement
with economic issues.
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